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COMMENTS
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act of .1927: Half-Way
Protection for the Stevedore and the
Longshoreman
The longshoreman is unique among industrial employees in
several ways. First, his occupation involves innumerable crossings
over the ill-defined line which separates land from navigable waters.
Second, in the course of his employment he is likely to spend a great
amount of time on premises (a vessel) maintained by a party (a
shipowner) who is not his employer. Moreover, a longshoreman
must often use equipment supplied by the shipowner. Partially
because of these singular aspects of his employment, an injured
longshoreman has a vast and potentially confusing array of remedies.
Depending largely upon his location at the time of injury, he may
have a right to recover by way of one or more of the following: an
action under state workmen's compensation legislation against his
employer (herein called a stevedore), a proceeding against the stevedore under a federal compensation act, and a. damage action against
the shipowner for both unseaworthiness and negligence.1 The chart
on the next page sets forth in an oversimplified fashion the principal
remedies available to employees injured on or near navigable waters.
The law relating to longshoremen's remedies abounds with surprising anomalies, hyper-technical distinctions, and bits and pieces
of judicial legislation. This situation stems largely from deficiencies
in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of
1927,2 an inherently inadequate statute greatly distorted by recent
judicial interpretation. This Comment undertakes an examination
of the act's most salient shortcomings with a view to suggesting possible guidelines for what is believed to be necessary corrective
legislation.3
1. See generally Gainsburgh & Fallon, Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co.: The
Twilight's Last Gleaming?, 37 TuL. L. REv. 79 (1962); McKinstry, The Yaka Decision
-Judidal Repeal of Section 5 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 31 INS. COUNSEL J. 90 (1964); Pillsbury, 'Stevedore's Duty To Indemnify
Shipowners for Injuries to Longshoremen-Employees, 15 liAsTINGs L.J. 530 (1964);
Shields & Byrne, Application of the "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine to Longshoremen,
Ill U. PA. L. REv. 1137 (1963); Stover, Longshoreman-Shipowner-Stevedore: The Circle
of Liability, 61 MICH. L. R.Ev. 539 (1963); Till & Bluestein, Amphibious Problems in
State Workmen's Compensation Claims, 32 INS. COUNSEL J. 472 (1965); Weinstock, The
Emplc,yer's Duty To Indemnify Shipowners for Damages Recovered by Harbor Workers, 103 u. PA. L. R.Ev. 321 (1954); 37 TUL. L. REv. 786 (1963); 36 id. 134 (1961).
2. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964). Although "harbor worker" is
not defined in the act, the act's jurisdictional requirement indicates that Congress
meant the legislation to cover only those harbor workers who, like longshoremen,
work very near the water.
3. An initial and sometimes difficult distinction must be made between a long-
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• The fellow-servant and assumption-of-risk defenses are eliminated; comparative
negligence replaces contributory negligence.
•• The employee is precluded if his injury resulted solely from his intoxication,
... Contributory negligence will reduce a recovery.
shoreman or harbor worker and a seaman. This distinction is crucial because § 3(a)(l)
of the Longshoremen's Act excludes injuries suffered by "a master or member of a
crew of any vessel" from the scope of the act. Moreover, the Merchant Marine Act
of 1920, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. 688 (1958), popularly called the Jones Act, granting
seamen an FELA-type damage remedy against their employers, is unavailable to long•
shoremen because § 5 of the Longshoremen's Act makes compensation under the
Longshoremen's Act a longshoreman's exclusive remedy against his employer. See text
accompanying notes 56-58 infra. Thus, the Jones Act and the Longshoremen's Act arc
mutually exclusive. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334 (1953); Desper v.
Starved Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187 (1952). The fact that a person has accepted
benefits under the Longshoremen's Act does not necessarily preclude his bringing a
later suit under the Jones Act if the former award is offset against any subsequent
recovery. See Lawrence v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 194 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Va. 1961),
aff'd, 319 F.2d 805 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 952 (1963); GILMORE &: BLACK,
.ADMIRALTY 355 (1957). The distinction seems to hinge on whether a particular em•
ployee has a fairly permanent connection with the vessel and is on board "primarily
to aid in navigation." If so, he is a seaman. See Texas Co. v. Savore, 240 F.2d 674
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 846 (1957); cf. Davis v. Department of Labor &: Indus.,
317 U.S. 249, 253 (1942).
4. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). This act made the, damage remedy
provided by the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended,
45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964), applicable to seamen. Regarding the relevance of the Jones
Act to longshoremen's relief, see note 3 supra.
5. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
6. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), which first extended the
benefits of the seaworthiness warranty to longshoremen. See generally text accompanying notes 59-70 infra.
7. See generally 36 TUL. L. REv. 134 (1961).
8. See Pope &: Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Lahde v. Soc, Armadora
Del Norte, 220 F.2d 357 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955). The availability
of this remedy is largely an academic question, for the unseaworthiness doctrine,
under which recovery may be obtained without proof of negligence, will be available
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The Longshoremen's Act was adopted in response to a series of
Supreme Court decisions which made it clear that state compensation acts could not constitutionally afford relief to harbor workers
injured on navigable waters. 9 The admiralty law had to remain
uniform; maritime injuries could not receive varying treatment under different local laws.10 A void, intolerable in that era of workmen's compensation ascendancy,U resulted; the inapplicability of
state legislation meant that injured longshoremen were covered by
no compensation statute. Congress quickly responded to the Court's
prompting by adopting the Longshoremen's Act. 12 However, the
legislative history of the provision clearly indicates that, despite urgings for a more extensive law, the act was intended to do no more
than to fill the vacuum. Wherever possible, state compensation legislation was to be applied. 13 Therefore, a longshoreman was not covered by the new statute in a comprehensive, functional manner
based upon his occupational status.14 Instead, section 3(a) provides
him relief only if his "disability or death results from an injury
occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including
any dry dock) and if recovery for the disability or death through
workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided
by State law." 15
In performing his duties of loading and unloading, alongshoreman constantly crosses between land and vessels or barges anchored
upon navigable waters. 16 Therefore, section 3(a) has inevitably genin most instances in which a plaintiff could rely upon a common-law negligence
theory. See GILMORE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 3, at 364.
9. Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
10. See cases cited note 9 supra.
11. See I LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION I.Aw § 5.30 (1965 ed.).
12. See generally Washington v. W. A. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 227-28 (1924).
13. See Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 344 F.2d 640, 643-44 (2d Cir. 1965);
Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md. 1965). Prior to the passage of the
Longshoremen's Act, the Supreme Court had declared unconstitutional two congressional attempts to apply state compensation acts to longshoremen. Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) (declaring unconstitutional 40 Stat. 395 (1917) as
an invalid attempt to delegate federal power to the states); Washington v. W. C.
Dawson & Co., supra note 12 (declaring 42 Stat. 634 (1922) invalid on similar grounds).
See generally GILMORE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 3, at 333-40.
14. See Johnson v. Traynor, supra note 13, at 188-90; Clark, The Longshoreman and
Accident Compensation, 22 MONTHLY LAlloR REv. 753, 756 (1926).
15. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1424,
33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1964).
16. "Any rule that we [adopt in applying § 3(a)] ••• is necessarily arbitrary from the
longshoreman's point of view because the boundary line between land and sea is
crossed by a great deal of traffic and many injuries occur near the line." Michigan
Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 344 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 1965) (Hays, J., dissenting).
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erated much litigation, and the illogical and impractical jurisdictional requirement which it established has given birth to a host
of strained distinctions. 17 For example, a longshoreman injured at
any point on a gangplank is injured on navigable waters and is thus
within the scope of the act, because a gangplank is considered an
~xtension of a vessel. 18 On the other hand, a harbor worker injured
while standing on a pier is not within the protection of the act,
because, although the injury might have occurred at a point over
navigable waters, the entire pier is considered to be an extension of
the land.19 Most difficult to resolve, however, are the jurisdictional
questions arising in those cases where a longshoreman standing on
land or an extension thereof either falls or is pushed into navigable
waters and there sustains injury or drowns. Here resort is had to
less manageable admiralty principles.

A. The Locality Test
Historically, the existence of an admiralty court's jurisdiction
over suits arising from tortious conduct has been determined by the
"locality test." In the landmark case of The Plymouth,20 the United
States Supreme Court declared that in order for a tort to be considered "maritime," "the wrong and injury complained of must have
been committed wholly upon the high seas or navigable waters, or,
at least, the substance and consummation of the same must have
taken place upon these waters ...." 21 In thus establishing the locality
test, the Court actually appears to have set forth two standards and
seems to have ruled that an admiralty court can take jurisdiction of
a tort action if either is satisfied. Moreover, the second guideline
(substance and consummation) is certainly less precise than the first,
and has been applied less strictly. For example, where one is pushed
17. See Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F. Supp. 184, 189 n.4 (1965), where the court of•
fered "as an illustration of the complexities and sometimes the absurdities of juris•
diction problems the case of the fat longshoreman who, in falling, hit both the wharf
[calling into effect local law] and the ship [calling into play the Longshoremen's
Act] ••••"
18. See The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649 (1935); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205 (1917).
19. Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1 (1946); State Indus. Comm'n v. Nordcnholt
Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922); Hastings v. Mann, 340 F.2d 910, 911-12 (4th Cir, 1965).
Section 3 expressly states that injuries occurring on dry docks are within the pur•
view of the act. The term "dry dock." has been held to include marine railroads,
with the result that a worker killed in an explosion on a barge drawn four hundred
feet from the water's edge was held to be covered by the Longshoremen's Act in
Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. v. Henderson, 201 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam,
346 U.S. 366 (1953). The Avondale rule was significantly expanded in Holland v. Har•
rison Bros. Dry Dock. &: Repair Yard, Inc., 306 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1962), reversing
Harrison lkos. Dry Dock. &: Repair Yard, Inc. v. Donovan, 194 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.
Ala. 1961).
20. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865).
21. Id. at 35. (Emphasis added.)
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from a boat to a wharf and thereby injured, the standard that both
the wrong and the injury must have occurred on navigable waters
would not be met, and admiralty jurisdiction would be lacking.22
However, the vagueness of the second test would enable a court to
hold that the receipt of the blow aboard the vessel was the "substance and consummation" of the wrong and the injury necessary to
render the tort "maritime," despite the fact that the victim's descent
ended when he struck an extension of land. Of course, this reasoning would preclude the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction where a
plaintiff was knocked from a wharf into navigable waters.23
Where due to an unknown cause a person falls from a vessel
onto a wharf, or from a wharf into navigable waters, it can be
extremely difficult to determine where the "substance and consummation" of the wrong and injury lies. In the wharf-to-water situation, it is certainly arguable that at least "the substance and consummation of the occurrence which gave rise to the cause of action"
took place entirely in the water, for it cannot be shown that any
blow or injury was sustained on the wharf. 24 Nevertheless, something caused the unfortunate victim to fall; therefore, it can just
as easily be contended that only the consummation of the occurrence
actually happened upon navigable waters, in which case admiralty
jurisdiction would be lacking. In deciding whether admiralty juris- diction is present in a particular case, a court can reach either an
affirmative or a negative result by emphasizing the events which
transpired on one side or the other of the line separating land from
water.
Since the Longshoremen's Act was designed to provide relief
only in those cases in which state compensation legislation could
not constitutionally be applied because the events from which a
claim arose were within the exclusive cognizance of admiralty, it is
not surprising that the locality test, originally formulated to determine the presence of admiralty jurisdiction over tort claims, was
quickly adopted as an aid in deciding whether the navigable-waters
.22. See The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649 (1935); Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal
Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935); Caldaro v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 166 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y
1956). But cf. The Stabro, 98 Fed. 998 (2d Cir. 1900) (court refused to read the
Plymouth test literally and declared irrelevant the place of consummation); O'Donnell
v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 42 (1943) ("[The] admiralty jurisdiction
over the suit depends not on the place where the injury is inflicted but on the
nature of the service [performed by the victim] and its relationship· to the operation
of the vessel plying in navigable waters.'); Castillo v. Argonaut Trading Agency, Inc.,
156 F. Supp. 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Compare Thibodeaux v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.,
276 F.2d 42, 49 (5th Cir. 1960), where it was suggested that the locality test
"may well involve many variables and it may be that the ultimate decision can scarcely
be made on such an easy mechanical, i.e., physical, basis [e.g., point at which the
substance and consummation of an injury occurred]."
23. See T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928); Wiper v. Great Lakes
Eng'r Works, 340 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1965).
24. Thibodeaux v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 276 F.2d 42, 49 (5th Cir. 1960).
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jurisdictional requirement of the act had been satisfied.20 Thus,
where a plaintiff had been knocked from a dock into the water, a
strict interpretation df the locality test would deny him relief under
the act because the wrong (or its equivalent in the context of workmen's compensation legislation) and the injury had not both occurred on navigable waters. 26 The "substance and consummation"
version of the locality test engenders the same difficulties when applied in connection with a claim brought under the act as it did in
the context of a suit arising from an "amphibious tort." 27 However,
recent decisions have rendered questionable the viability of either
form of the locality test in litigation under the Longshoremen's
Act. 28

B. The Line Moves Shoreward
In Interlake Steamship Go. v. Nielsen, 20 a shipkeeper who had
driven his car off a dock and into Lake Erie in the course of inspecting a moored vessel was deemed to have been covered by the Longshoremen's Act. Since there was a complete lack of evidence showing
what had caused the car to leave the pier, the court might have
spoken in terms of "substance and consummation" and reached its
result by reference to the locality test. 30 Nevertheless, it chose to
reject entirely the locality test precedents and to rely exclusively
upon the fact that no evidence had been offered showing that any
injury had been sustained until decedent's car had struck the frozen,
but othenvise navigable, waters of the lake. It sought to justify its
approach by referring to the "impact of the Admiralty Extension
Act" 31 and to recent Supreme Court dicta in Galbeck v. Travelers
Ins. Co.82 that "Congress intended the [Longshoreman's] compensation act to have a coverage co-extensive with the limits of its
authority ... .''83
The Admiralty Extension Act, adopted in 1948, did alter the
historical locality test somewhat by extending admiralty jurisdiction
to cover "all cases of damage or injury ... caused by a vessel on
25. See Caldaro v. Baltimore &: Ohio R.R., 166 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
26. But cf. Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 238 F. Supp. 78, 81 (E.D. Va.
1965), where it was suggested that if there had been no impact upon a person falling
from land into water until he had hit the water, the Longshoremen's Act would apply.
27. See Smith &: Son v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928); Thibodeaux v. J. Ray McDer•
mott &: Co., 276 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1960).
28. Interlake Steamship Co. v. Nielsen, 338 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1964); Gulf Oil Corp.
v. O'Keeffe, 242 F. Supp. 881 (E.D.S.C. 1965); Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting,
238 F. Supp. 78 (E.D. Va. 1965).
29. 338 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1964).
30. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
31. 62 Stat. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).
32. 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
33. Id. at 130. Actually, the Court in Calbeck was quoting from De Bardeleben
Coal Corp. v. Henderson, 142 F.2d 481, 483-84 (5th Cir. 1944).

June 1966]

The Stevedore and the Longshorem_an

1559

navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be
done or consummated on land."34 However, the validity of the
Nielsen court's placing even indirect reliance upon this legislation
is dubious, for the Extension Act is, by its language, applicable
only in cases in which a vessel has caused damage on land, and in
Nielsen no vessel had caused any damage. Nevertheless, it has been
argued~ although unsuccessfully, that by altering the locality test to
bring some shoreside injuries within the scope of admiralty jurisdiction, the Extension Act has similarly expanded the coverage of
the Longshoremen's Act to include injuries occurring entirely on
land.36 This possibility was exhaustively explored in the recent case
of Johnson v. Traynor. 86 The express language of the Extension Act,
the legislative.history of both statutes, and administrative interpretations convinced the court that the Longshoremen's Act did not
cover a person who had sustained an injury on a wharf. Indeed, the
court felt that any other holding would have been the product of
"the grossest type of judicial legislation."37
The Nielsen court's reliance on Calbeck was equally misplaced,
because in that case the Supreme Court was concerned only with
the question whether injuries occurring on navigable waters should
nevertheless be compensable under state law because the activity
from which the harm arose was of purely "local concern."38 Indeed,
34. Admiralty Extension Act, 62 Stat. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).
35. See, e.g., Gladden v. Stockard S.S. Co., 184 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1950); Michigan
Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 233 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 640 (2d 1Cir.
1965); Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md. 1965).
36. 243 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md. 1965).
37. Id. at 192. "It can hardly be said that the Extension in Admiralty Act was also
intended to amend the federal compensation act to include injuries occurring on land
as well as 'upon the navigable waters.'" Revel v. American Export Lines, Inc., 162
F. Supp. 279, 284 (E.D. Va. 1958), afj'd, 266 F.2d 82, 84 (4th Cir. 1959).
The Nielsen court might have buttressed its position by citing § 20(a) of the
Longshoremen's Act, which establishes a presumption that, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, a claim comes within the act. This argument was used
in a case involving somewhat similar facts in Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting,
238 F. Supp. 78, 79 (E.D. Va. 1965). But see Atlantic Stevedoring Co. v. O'Keeffe, 220
F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Ga. 1963), where it was suggested that a distinction could be made
between presumption of coverage and presumption that the jurisdictional requirement of the act had been met. "Jurisdiction must be first established, and when once
shown, then and only then, does the coverage presumption become effective." Id. at
885.
38. See Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 344 F.2d 640, 647 n.l (2d Cir. 1965);
Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F. Supp. 184, 195 (D. Md. 1965). More specifically, the
court in Calbeck was dealing with the troublesome jurisdictional concept embodied
in the "twilight zone" doctrine. This principle, first enunciated in Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942), was intended to counter the injustices resulting
from the application of the "local concern" doctrine. Briefly, the latter theory allowed
state compensation acts to be applied in cases involving injuries sustained on navigable waters if the injured party's work was purely of "local concern." Usually situations where an employee who normally engaged in non-maritime activity was injured
when he temporarily ventured onto navigable waters were deemed to be objects of
local concern. See, e.g., Carlin Constr. Co. v. Heaney, 299 U.S. 41 (1936); Sultan Ry. &
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the Court implicitly accepted the validity of applying the locality
test in the initial determination whether an employee is covered by
the Longshoremen's Act.89
C. The Impact of Nielsen
Two district court cases illustrate Nielsen's impact on the vitality of the locality test. In 1963, before Nielsen, the Longshoremen's
Act was held inapplicable where a longshoreman had been accidentally lifted from a dock by a dock-based winch and dropped into
Timber Co. v. Department of Labor, 277 U.S. 135 (1928); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v.
McManigal, 87 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1937). The local concern doctrine was developed
prior to the enactment of the Longsboremen's Act (see Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. V,
Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922)), in an attempt partially to fill the void left by Southern
Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), whiclt had held that state compensation acts
could not constitutionally cover injuries on navigable waters. Although the Long•
shoremen's Act eliminated the void entirely, the local concern doctrine nevertheless
continued to be applied, ironically as a defense to Longshorcmen's Act claims. Sec
Gainsburgh & Fallon, supra note I, at 82-83. The continued viability of the doctrine
was justified on the basis of the somewhat nebulous language in § 3 of the Longshoremen's Act, whiclt states that compensation is payable under the act only if it
may not "validly be provided by State law." Moreover, because the area of "local
concern" was never clearly defined, the dangers were great that an employee, by
cltoosing the wrong forum, would incur unnecessary expense and possibly cause
the statute of limitations on a claim under state law to expire.
To mitigate these risks, the Court in Davis held that where the local nature of the
employment was uncertain, the injured employee could proceed under state legislation
or the federal act and an award under either would be sustained on appeal. This
"twilight zone" rested upon two presumptions. First, where compensation has been
awarded under the federal act, 28 U.S.C. § 920 (1964) is applicable; that section creates
a presumption in favor of determinations by a federal agency. Second, where there
have been no federal findings, but an award under a state act has been made, a pre•
sumption of the constitutionality of state action is applicable. Moreover, receipt of
benefits under a state act does not prevent an award of compensation under the
federal act (see Western Boat B1dg. Co. v. O'Leary, 198 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1952);
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. O'Heame, 192 F.2d 968 (4th Cir.
1951)), although sums received under state law are credited against the federal award.
See Holland v. Harrison Bros. Dry Dock & Ship Repair Yard, Inc., 306 F.2d 369 (5th
Cir. 1962). The Longshoremen's Act statute of limitations, § 13(a), is tolled while pay•
ments are being made under a state act. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dry Dock v.
Brown, 147 F.2d 265 (N.D. Ill. 1930).
Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962), has apparently substantially
altered the twilight zone doctrine by virtually eliminating the local concern theory.
A thorough review of legislative history convinced the Supreme Court that "Congress in•
tended the [federal] compensation act to have a coverage co-extensive with the limits
of its authority and that [§ 3] ••• was placed in the act not as a relinquishment of
of any part of the field whiclt Congress could validly occupy but only to save the
act from judicial condemnation, by making it clear that it did not intend to legislate
beyond its constitutional powers • • • ." Id. at 130. Thus, a welder working on a
partially constructed barge floating on navigable waters was within the federal act
regardless of local concern. Calbeck is deemed by some commentators to have elimi•
nated the twilight zone. See, e.g., Gainsburgh & Fallon, supra note I; 50 CALIF. L. R.Ev.
342 (1962). However, Till & Bluestein, supra note 1, have suggested otherwise, citing
Holland v. Harrison Bros. Dry Dock & Repair Co., 306 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1962), ancl
Matherenc v. Superior Oil Co., 207 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. La. 1962).
39. See, e.g., Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra note 38, at 115-17, 119, 124•27,
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the water behv-een the ship and the pier.4° Citing decisions which
had turned upon the application of the "substance and consummation" version of the locality test, the court held that the injury frQm
which the dispute had arisen had not been sustained on navigable
waters and that the act was therefore irrelevant.41 In 1965, in· Gulf
Oil Corp. v. O'Keeffe,42 however, the act was held to have covered
a deceased engineer who had last been seen "ma,king an effort to get
off the barge on to the dock [when] immediately thereafter a splash
was heard." 43 Completely ignoring the locality test, the court held,
on the authority of Nielsen, that recovery under the Longshoremen's
Act was proper regardless of whether the deceased had fallen from
the dock or from the barge.44
In contrast to the modification of the principles for applying the
federal compensation act's jurisdictional requisites, recent cases have
continued to rely upon the locality test in admiralty tort cases
brought by or on behalf of persons who fall off docks into navigable
waters. 45 Indeed, the very court which decided Nielsen recently limited the applicability of its holding in that case to Longshoremen's
Act jurisdictional controversies and applied the locality test in Wiper
v. Great Lakes Engineering Works, 46 where a claim was premised
upon an admiralty tort theory. An inebriated ship's engineer had
gone ashore at night to procure some equipment. His body was recovered three days later from the slip at which his vessel had been
tied up; the cause of his death was found to have been asphyxia by
drowning. After losing a Jones Act suit against his employer (the
shipowner),47 decedent's widow sued the dock owner for having
negligently failed to provide a safe mooring area. The trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendant on the basis of Michigan common law. On appeal, plaintiff argued that maritime law,
rather than state law, was applicable. Since the dock, which for the
purpose of testing the complaint on a motion to dismiss was presumed to have been the cause of decedent's fall, was an extension of
land, the court held, on the basis of the locality test, -that maritime
40, Atlantic Stevedoring v. O'Keeffe, 220 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Ga. 1963).
41. The court relied upon Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647
(1935), and T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928). See text accompanying
note 23 supra.
42, Gulf Oil Corp. v. O'Keeffe, 242 F. Supp. 881 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
43. Id. at 882.
44. Compare Boston Metals Co. v. O'Hearne, 329 F.2d 504 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 824 (1964). The court in O'Keeffe probably could have reached the same
result had it applied the locality test. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
. 45. See, e.g., Hastings v. Mann, 340 F.2d 910 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 963
(1965); Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965).
46, 340 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1965).
47. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964), popularly called the Jones Act, grants to seamen an FELA damage remedy against their
employers. See generally note 3 supra.
'
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law was inapplicable. The court reasoned that "the tort was complete before decedent ever touched the water and this being true,
the subsequent drowning is significant not to determine the maritime or non-maritime nature of this action but only as it relates to
damages." 48 It should be noted that while plaintiff's case here rested
on the assumption that a defect in a dock had caused deceased's fall
into the water, in Nielsen there was no evidence to indicate what
had caused the victim to drive off the dock. Although the cases are
thus distinguishable, the Nielsen court made no attempt to limit
the effect of its holding to situations where no evidence of cause
is presented, but implied that all injuries sustained by harbor workers and consummated on navigable waters are compensable under
the Longshoremen's Act regardless of their cause.40 Despite its language in Nielsen, the court really did not feel that the Extension
Act eliminated the locality test.

D. Problems and Policy
Even when the locality test was uniformly applied by the federal
courts in harbor worker injury cases, there could be difficulties in
determining whether relief was available under the Longshoremen's
Act or under state compensation legislation.rm Now, when seemingly
different standards are applied-the "consummation of the wrong
and the injury" test and Nielsen's "consummation or 'situs' of the
injury alone" formula-an attempt to predict the results of this
determination in some cases must challenge the most experienced
maritime lawyer. 51 Moreover, a bad guess on the attorney's part
can deprive an injured harbor worker of any remedy, for, although
the statute of limitations applicable to suits under the Longshoremen's Act is tolled while a harbor worker vainly pursues a state
compensation remedy, the relevant limitation period on claims under state compensation acts may continue to run while he seeks redress under federal law. 52 Thus, where the jurisdictional facts which
48. Wiper v. Great Lakes Eng'r Works, 340 F.2d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 1965).
49. Since the Admiralty Extension Act had been specifically designed to affect
admiralty tort jurisdiction, the result in Wiper suggests that, despite its language in
Nielsen, the Sixth Circuit did not actually feel that the Extension Act eliminated
the locality test.
50. See, e.g., The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649 (1935); T. Smith &: Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928); Thibodeaux v. J. Ray McDermott&: Co., 276 F.2d 42 (5th Cir.
1960); Independence Indem. Co. v. Mansfield, 2 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928);
St. John v. Thomson, 108 Vt. 66, 182 Atl. 196 (1936).
51. Compare Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 238 F. Supp. 78 (E.D. Va. 1965),
with Hastings v. Mann, 340 F.2d 910 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 963 (1965).
52. See Great Lakes Dredge &: Dock Co. v. Brown, 47 F.2d 265 (N.D. Ill. 1930), dis•
cussing the federal act. The status of state law is demonstrated by Nielsen itself,
where the Ohio workmen's compensation statute of limitations had run before the
plaintiff was certain that she had a federal remedy. Brief for Respondent, p. 6 (peti•
tion for certiorari), Interlake Steamship Co. v. Nielsen, 338 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1964).
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must be proved to obtain relief under federal law are uncertain, it
would be unwise for an injured harbor worker to seek the Longshoremen's Act remedy first, although the amount of recovery allowed by state compensation legislation is usually substantially less
than that provided by the federal statute. 53 If Longshoremen's Act
protection were found to be lacking, the untolled statute of limitations on the claim arising under the relevant state legislation might
have run in the meantime, and the injured employee would find
· himself without any compensation _remedy. 54
Two possible explanations can be offered for the current judicial
trend extending Longshoremen's Act coverage landward. First, the
courts may have simply recognized that ·a navigable-waters jurisdictional requirement in a workmen's compensation law ostensibly
designed to afford relief to employees whose duties require them to
divide their time between activities on land and on water is both
illogical and impractical. Once the Longshoremen's Act has been
invoked and compensation awarded, the hyper-technical distinctions
which must be drawn in order to apply the locality test should not
call for a reversal. Second, and probably more important, the courts
are doubtless aware that Longshoremen's Act compensation awards
can be more generous than the recoveries available under state legislation for comparable injuries. Where picayune fact distinctions can
determine whether the same injury is worth fifty-four dollars per
month throughout the entire period of disability or only thirty dollars monthly for a maximum of three hundred weeks, 55 the temptation to give a plaintiff the benefit of the more generous federal scale
should not be underestimated.
While the motivation underlying these recent decisions may be
admirable, the results leave much to be desired. Nielsen's new, imperfectly established jurisdictional test, which at most only gives an
injured longshoreman the protection of the federal act if he was
fortunate enough to sustain at least part of his injury on navigable
waters, is no more logical than its predecessor; the longshoreman
53. See generally U.S. Chamber of Commerce Analysis of Workmen's Compensation
Laws Gan. 1962); id. (Supp. Jan. 1963); 30 N.A.C.C.A.L.J. 200, 205 (1964); 36 TuL. L.
REv. 134, 137 (1961). Under certain circumstances an injured longshoreman may nevertheless desire to proceed under a state law, as, for example, where procedural rules
may preclude recovery under the federal act (see Bryce v. Todd Shipyard, 17 App. Div.
2d 666, 229 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1962)), or where the relevant state act may be more liberal in
defining "total disability." See 36 TuL. L. REv. 134, 137 n.16 (1961).
54. The prudent claimant may be able to protect himself against the running of
the state statute of limitations by incurring the expense of double filing, for some
state compensation acts contain statutes of limitations which are tolled when a claim
is filed. See, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. § 656.274 (1964). However, other state acts require
the filing and prosecution of a claim within the limitation period. See, e.g., LA. REv.
STAT. § 23:1209 (1964); 50 CALIF. L. REv. 342, 344 n.15, 346 n.38 (1962).
55. Compare LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1231 (1964) with 70 Stat. 655 (1956), 33 U.S.C.
§§ 908-09 (1964). See generally 36 TuL. L. REv. 134, 137 (1961).
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is still covered:..__at least- potentially-by two disparate compensation
laws. It seems that the zone of superficial distinctions and difficult
fact determinations has merely been carried a few steps shoreward.
II. AN

INADEQUACY A.RISING FROM JUDICIAL LEGISLATION:
THE DEMISE OF SECTION 5

Section 5 of the Longshoremen's Act provides:
The liability of an employer ... [for compensation ascertained
by reference to a standard schedule] shall be exclusive and in
place of all other liability of such employer to the employee,
his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents,
next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages
... on account of such injury or death ....56
This provision, typical for a compensation act, imposes upon an
employer limited and determinate liability in exchange for his
bearing liability for an employee's injury regardless of whether the
harm can be attributed to the employer's fault. 57 However, recent
decisions call into serious question the continued efficacy of this
apparently unequivocal provision; the longshoreman can now often
recover, either directly or indirectly, damages unlimited in amount
from his stevedore-employer. 68 Since the stevedore normally does not
own the ship with which the victim was connected at the time of
injury, a two-step procedure must generally be employed in order
to circumvent section 5.
A. The First Step: Recovery Against the Shipowner--The

Seaworthiness Doctrine
The Longshoremen's Act, in conformity with other workmen's
compensation legislation, preserves the injured employee's ordinary
rights against any party responsible for the harm other than his
immediate employer. 69 Since most injuries to longshoremen occur
56. 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).
57. See Stover, Longshoreman-Shipowner-Stevedore: The Circle of Liability, 61
MICH. L. REv. 539, 542 (1963). It is suggested in McKinstry, The Yaka Decision-Judi•
cial Repeal of Section 5 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, 31 INs. COUNSEL J. 90 (1964), that the Supreme Court in Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22, 37 (1932), characterized the exclusive liability provision of § 5 as fundamental
to the constitutionality of the act. This seems to be a somewhat strained interpretation
of the case, however, for it appears that the Court actually said only that the navi•
gable-waters requirement and the existence of a master-servant relationship between
an injured employee and an employer-defendant were essential to the constitutional
application of the act. See Crowell v. Benson, supra, at 37-38.
58. See, e.g., Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963); DeGioia v. United States
Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962).
59. 73 Stat. 391 (1959), 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1964). See generally Pillsbury, Stevedore's
Duty To Indemnify Shipowners for Injuries to Longshoremen-Employees, 15 HASTINGS
L.J. 530 (1964). Once an injured longshoreman accepts compensation under a compen•
(l
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around vessels during the course of loading or unloading, damage
suits against shipowners are common. 60 In such actions, a longshoreman has recourse to a potent remedy once reserved for seamen alone:
the seaworthiness doctrine imposing liability without fault. 61 When
a shipmvner warrants by implication that his vessel is seaworthy, he
is bound to provide a ship free of structural defects as well as defective machinery, equipment, and tackle. 62 A shipowner can also be
liable on an unseaworthiness theory for injuries attributable to an
unfit crew, 63 the improper stowage of cargo, 64 and even defective
equipment supplied by a stevedore but used in conjunction with the
ship.611 Furthermore, under maritime law, assumption of risk is not
a defense to unseaworthiness liability, and contributory negligence
does not preclude relief but merely mitigates the amount of recovery
on a comparative-fault basis. 66
While the seaworthiness doctrine originally gave rise to a cause
of action only for injuries caused by defects directly connected with
the ship or its appurtenances, the warranty has ventured landward
via recent judicial decisions in a manner markedly similar to that
sation order, § 33(b) provides for the automatic assignment of all his rights against
third parties to his employer unless the injured employee commences an action
against the third party within six months of the award. See McClendon v. Charente
S.S. Co., 227 F. Supp. 256 (S.D. Tex. 1964). But cf. Leonard v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
267 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1959).
60. See, e.g., Mortensen v. Glittre, 348 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1965); Albanese v. N.V.
Nederl. Amerik. Stoomv. Maats., 346 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1965); Misurella v. Isthmian
Lines, Inc., 328 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1964).
61. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960); Seas• Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). Sieracki is the landmark case which first extended seaworthiness warranty liability for longshoremen's shipboard injuries. The Sieracki
holding, originally construed narrowly to apply only to longshoremen (Guerrini v.
United States, 167 F.2d 352 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 843 (1948)), was extended
to encompass all harbor workers in Pope &: Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
The injured longshoreman, as a business invitee, may also have a negligence cause of
action against the shipowner. Ibid.
The Court in Sieracki justified its extension of seaworthiness protection to longshoremen on the ground that, historically, a vessel was unloaded by members of the
crew. "[The longshoreman is], in short, a seaman because he is doing a seaman's
work ••••" Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, supra, at 99. The historical accuracy of the
Court's premise has been convincingly challenged in Shields &: Byrne, Application of
the "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine to Longshoremen, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1137, 1139-47
Q96~.
.
62. See Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 213 (1963); Mesle v.
Kea S.S. Corp., 260 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966 (1959); Di Salvo v.
Cunard S.S. Co., 171 F. Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Bishop v. Alaska S.S. Co., 404 P.2d
990 (Wash. 1965). See generally Stover, supra note 57; 36 TuL. L. REv. 329 (1962).
63. See Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955); Keen v. Overseas
Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1952).
64. See Morales v. City of Galveston, 370 U.S. 165 (1962).
65. Rogers v. United States Lines, 347 U.S. 984 (1954); Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson,
347 U.S. 396 (1954).
66. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale, 358 U.S. 625, 629 (1959) (contributory negligence); Pope &: Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 408 (1953) (contributory negligence); Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1939) (assumption of
risk); The Arizona v. Anelick, 298 U.S. 110 (1936) (assumption of risk).
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of the remedy provided by the Longshoremen's Act. 67 For example,
recovery has been allowed when a longshoreman slipped upon sand
which had seeped from bags as they were being removed from a
truck after they had been unloaded from a vessel.68 Similarly, a longshoreman injured by a defective land-based hopper which was not
attached to a vessel in any manner recovered damages in an unseaworthiness action. 69 In each case, recovery was rationalized on the
ground that since the plaintiff had been engaged in an unloading
process which was one continuous operation, he had been in the
ship's service although he had been standing on land. The eventual
limits of this new expansion are far from settled or even foreseeable. 70 It is perhaps ironic, however, that this traditional maritime
remedy has ventured much farther inland than has relief afforded
by the federal compensation act, which was specifically intended to
protect the longshoreman but which even under the liberal Nielsen
view can be the basis for recovery only if his injury has its "situs"
on the water.
B. The Second Step: Shipowner's Recovery From the StevedoreEmployer--The Indemnity Doctrine
Where a shipowner has been rendered liable for damages due to
an unseaworthy condition wholly or partially brought about by a
stevedore, it is understandable that he would look to that stevedore
for redress. In 1952, the Supreme Court rejected a shipowner's argument that he had a right to contribution against the stevedore based
on the mutual-fault rule regularly applied in ship collision cases,
by which contributory negligence is not a defense but damages are
apportioned according to the fault attributable to each vessel's
owner.71 The Court felt that expanding the application of this principle beyond the collision context would amount to judicial legislation; thus, the normal tort rule disallowing contribution among
joint tortfeasors prevailed. 72
67. Compare The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903), with Gutierrez v. Waterman Steam•
ship Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963), and Hagans v. Ellerman &: Buchnall S.S. Co., 196
F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1961). In Gutierrez, where the Supreme Court first extended
the seaworthiness remedy dockside, a longshoreman had slipped on beans spilled
from defective bags. In the Court's view, the application of the Admiralty Extension
Act, 62 Stat. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964) (see generally text accompanying note
34 supra) was not limited to cases where damage on land was caused by the vessel or
by a particular part of it, but also extended to instances where a shipowner had
committed a tort before the ship had been completely unloaded, if the impact of the
misconduct was felt ashore at a time and place not too remote from the wrongful act,
68. Hagans v. Ellerman &: l3uchnall S.S. Co., supra note 67.
69. Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1965).
70. Compare Forkin v. Furness Withy &: Co., 323 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1963), with
Huff v. Matson Nav. Co., 338 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1964).
71. See Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling&: Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952),
72. The court expressly refused to consider the effect of § 5 on the rights of the
shipowner against the stevedore, Id. at 286 n.12.
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Nevertheless, in 1956 the Supreme Court accomplished even
more than it had refused to undertake four years earlier.73 In the
landmark case of Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.,74
the Court affirmed a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that indemnity over in the full amount of any verdict
obtained against him may be had by a shipowner from an employerstevedore whose negligence was the "sole," "active," or "primary"
cause of a longshoreman's injury. However, the Court's affirmation
was not based upon any concept of primary responsibility.75 Although there is some dispute among the commentators regarding
the precise rationale behind the ruling, at least it is clear that section 5 was circumvented by basing the shipowner's recovery on an
implied contract benv-een himself and the stevedore; therefore, the
shipowner's right to indemnity did not arise "on account of" the
injury to the employee, as this phrase is used in section 5.76 While
the exact nature of this implied contract is uncertain, it has been
suggested that in contracting with a shipowner a stevedore automatically warrants that he will perform his services in a workmanlike manner and that from this implicit obligation springs a further
implied agreement by which the stevedore is said to have promised
to indemnify the shipowner for damages resulting from unworkmanlike conduct.77
,
The far-reaching effect of Ryan can be illustrated by a recent
case in which an independent contractor's employee, a "harbor
worker" within the meaning of the act, slipped on an oil slick while
painting insignia on the funnel of a vessel. 78 The painter, alleging
unseaworthiness, sued the shipowner, who thereupon impleaded the
employer-contractor, claiming a right of indemnification if the employee should recover in the principal action. The jury found that
the presence of the oil slick had rendered the ship unseaworthy, but
73. See generally McKinstry, supra note 57.
74. 350 U.S. 124 (1956), affirming Palazzolo v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 211 F.2d 277
(2d Cir. 1954).
75. Indeed, the Supreme Court bas since expressly indicated that the terms "active"
and "passive" negligence have no role in indemnity cases. See Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v.
Nacirema Operations Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
'
76. See generally 2 l.AR.soN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LA.w § 76.10, at 229 (Supp.
1965); Pillsbury, supra note 59, at 547-48; Stover, supra note 57, at 550; 38 TUL. L.
R.Ev. 202, 203-04 (1964); 37 id. 786, 790 (1963).
77. See Pillsbury, supra note 59, at 544-49. Much of the confusion may stem from
the dissent in Ryan, which discussed the majority holding in terms of a contract implied in fact to indemnify a shipowner for injuries to a stevedore's employees caused
by the shipowner's negligence, rather than in terms of an implied contract by which
a stevedore agrees to indemnify the shipowner for losses sustained because the stevedore's service was not performed in a workmanlike manner. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v.
Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 141-44 (1956) (Black, J., dissenting). The dissent
indicated that this implied contract gave rise to liability "on account of" the longshoreman's injury and was clearly violative of § 5.
78. Mortensen v. Glittre, 348 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1965).
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because the employee had been guilty of contributory negligence
in failing to wipe up the oil after he had discovered it, the jury reduced by one third the amount to which it felt the victim would
otherwise have been entitled. The trial court then directed a verdict
in favor of the shipowner and against the contractor for the full
amount of the jury award, on the ground that the employee's contributory negligence, imputed to his employer, established as a mat•
ter of law the shipowner's right to full indemnity.
In view of the recent trend toward extending shoreward the
protection of the seaworthiness remedy, few would argue that section
5 of the Longshoremen's Act continues to offer great solace to the
stevedore. A high proportion of the injuries occurring during loading or unloading operations are probably attributable in some way
both to an unseaworthy vessel, appurtenance, or crew and also to
some unworkmanlike conduct on the part of the stevedore or his
employee. In this regard it must be remembered that a shipowner
can be held for breaching his seaworthiness warranty if the stevedore
supplies defective equipment.79 Under these circumstances a shipowner's recovery of indemnity over, even when he and the stevedore
are mutually at fault, is bound to be a frequent occurrence.80

C. A Shortcut
In the comparatively rare instance where a longshoreman's employer is also the owner of the vessel with which the longshoreman
was associated at the time of injury, the logical extension of the
Ryan rationale would indicate that the longshoreman must be satisfied with his compensation remedy. Since the stevedore and the &hipowner are the same, section 5 certainly cannot be circumvented on
the basis of an implied consensual agreement between the owner
and stevedore. However, in Reed v. The Yaka 81 the Supreme Court
concluded that "only blind adherence to the superficial meaning of
a statute" 82 could deprive such an employee of an opportunity to
try for more than the Longshoremen's Act has to offer. In Reed, a
longshoreman who had been injured when his foot went through a
79. The extent of the seaworthiness doctrine can hardly be overestimated, For
example, the shipowner's warranty clearly, extends to equipment owned and supplied
by a stevedore. See Rogers v. United States Lines, 347 U.S. 984 (1954): Alaska S.S. Co,
v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954). "The only case which is today clearly outside the
scope of the unseaworthiness doctrine is the almost theoretical construct of an injury
whose only cause is an order improvidently given by a concededly competent officer
on a ship admitted to be in all respects seaworthy." GILMORE &: BLACK, ADMIRALTY 820

QM~

.

80. See Pillsbury, supra note 59, at 559-61; Stover, supra note 57, at 562, The ship•
owner may also recover from the stevedore the costs of defending against the unsea•
worthiness claim. See Di Vittorio v. Skiles A/S Siljestad, 244 F. Supp. 48 (S,D.N,Y.
1965).
81. 373 U.S. 410 (1963).
82. Id. at 414-15.
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latently defective pallet on board a ship libelled the vessel, and its
owner impleaded the longshoreman's employer, who happened also
to be the bareboat charterer of the craft at the time of the injury.
A bareboat charterer is regarded the owner for purposes of warranting the seaworthiness of a vessel and, thus, is personally liable in
place of the actual owner on unseaworthiness claims.83 Therefore,
section 5 would seem unequivocally to have prevented the victim
from bringing an unseaworthiness action. Nevertheless, the Court
noted the cases allowing a longshoreman to recover on such a theory
where the stevedore was not directly responsible for a ship's seaworthiness, and declared that to deprive the longshoreman of his
seaworthiness remedy in this case "would produce a harsh and incongruous result." 84 Thus, despite the highly pertinent and seemingly
unqualifiedly prohibitive language of section 5, coupled with the
impossibility of basing .the result on an implied contract concept
as had been done in Ryan, the Court allowed the libellant to bring
a damage action directly against his employer in lieu of pursuing his
compensation remedy. Reed is thus an excellent example of the
conscious judicial legislation which has made the Longshoremen's
Act unworkable.

III.

CONCLUSION

The Longshoremen's Act was designed to provide the injured
harbor worker with a swift, certain and inexpensive remedy. 85 In
light of the recent cases discussed above, it is clear that these goals
have not been achieved. The act's illogical and impractical jurisdictional basis has resulted in extensive litigation and confusion,
which show no signs of diminishing. With its promise of more generous damage awards, the seaworthiness approach, which, taken together with a losing shipowner's inevitable search for indemnity,
normally results in the additional expense associated with impleader
or a second lawsuit, has supplanted to a significant degree the relatively simple and inexpensive administrative .compensation proceedings. Inevitably, where extensive litigation is required, larger
attorneys' fees reduce the value of the injured longshoreman's recovery; the prospect of larger damage awards can therefore be more
illusory than real. 86
83. See Cannella v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 174 F.2d 794 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 859 (1949); Vitozi v. Balboa Shipping Co., 163 F.2d 286 (1st Cir. 1947); cf. Loe v.
Goldstein, 101 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. 1939).
.
84. Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 415 (1963). The Court paid particular attention
to Ryan and Sieracki.
85. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 159 (1932); Stover, supra
note 57, at 542.
86. In Shields &: Byrne, supra note 61, at 1150, it is asserted that approximately
40% of the total estimated cost to the maritime industry of the extension of the
seaworthiness doctrine is attributable to lawyers' fees. Compare Conard, Workmen's
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Even while the proposed legislation which became the Longshoreman's Act was under consideration in Congress, legal scholars,
labor union representatives, and the Department of Labor urged
that the compensation scheme cover longshoremen and harbor
workers regardless of where they were injured, as long as the harm
that they suffered arose in the course of their employment. 87 Although there may have been doubts in 1927 that Congress could
enact such comprehensive legislation, it is clear that if these suggestions were heeded today, the commerce clause would supply the
constitutional authority for the enactment of a statute based upon
them.88 Coherence and ease of administration would further be
served if the act covered only those engaged in typical longshoreman
occupations in which they were consistently required to work near
the water's edge. The present act covers to an uncertain degree the
occasional visitor to navigable waters, such as an electronic-equipment repairman. 80 There is no compelling reason to place this kind
of employee, who is invariably within the ambit of state workmen's
compensation legislation, under the Longshoremen's Act simply because he is temporarily working on a moored vessel, for it is now
clear that state compensation laws may constitutionally cover him
even when he is injured on navigable waters. 00
Compensation: Is It More Efficient Than Employer's Liability?, 38 A.B.A.J. 1011
(1952), where it is tentatively suggested that the damage remedy provided by the
Federal Employer's Liability Act is more efficient than workmen's compensation relief
in terms of cost per dollar of benefit conferred.
In Shields &: Byrne, supra note 61, at 1147-48, it is noted that in one case, Holley
v. The Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Va. 1960), the longshoreman's widow's
net recovery on an unseaworthiness theory, after a 50% reduction in her award to
accommodate lawyers' fees, was $1,597.45 out of a gross cost to the employer, largely
attributable to defending in the indemnity action, of $24,293.71. It is estimated that
under the Longshoremen's Act she would have received $23,790.65. Since 73 Stat, 391
(1959), 33 U.S.C. § 933(£) (1964), provides that where recovery against the third party
is less than the compensation recovery would have been, compensation will be awarded
to make up the difference, the widow did not suffer, but the total expenditure re•
quired on the part of the em_ployer was $46,486.91.
87. See Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md. 1965); Clark, The Longshore•
man and Accident Compensation, 22 MoNTIILY LAlloR R.Ev. 753, 766 (1926).
88. See Atlantic Stevedoring Co. v. O'Keeffe, 220 F. Supp. 881, 883 (S.D. Ga. 1963),
and authorities cited in note 87 supra.
89. Compare Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962), with Bethlehem
Steel Co. v. Moores, 335 U.S. 874 (1948), and Holland v. Harrison Bros. Dry Dock &:
Repair Yard, Inc., 306 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1962). See discussion of local concern and twi•
light zone doctrines in note 38 supra.
90. See, e.g., Carlin Constr. Co. v. Heaney, 299 U.S. 41 (1936); Grant Smith-Porter
Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. McManigal, 87 F,2d
332 (2d Cir. 1937). These cases utilized the local concern doctrine, discussed in note 38
supra, to allow state compensation acts to apply constitutionally to some injuries on
- navigable waters. Uncertainties generated by the local concern principle resulted in
the formulation of the twilight zone doctrine, which in effect allowed either the
federal or state compensation acts to apply to local concern cases. Sec generally note 38
supra. It is arguable that Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962), has elim•
inated both the twilight zone and the local concern doctrines, not on constitutional
grounds, however, but rather because the Court felt that Congress intended the
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Because policy factors are both numerous and complex, a perfect
solution to the seaworthiness-indemnity approach, which virtually
destroys the significance of section 5, is not readily apparent. Although the judicial repeal of section 5 seems difficult to justify, and
the most apparent solution to the current problem would be to
force the shipowner to bear the full loss occasioned by a breach of
his seaworthiness warranty, the resulting burden on the shipowner
may be intolerable if the longshoreman, lured by potentially high
damage awards, persistently pursues his seaworthiness remedy rather
than his compensation remedy. Indeed, before the Court in Ryan
allowed indemnity over, stevedores customarily made voluntary
compensation payments to injured employees despite the absence
of a formal award under the act, in order to tide the longshoreman
over while, with the stevedore's blessing, he pursued his seaworthiness remedy against the shipowner. Since these payments were made
informally, there was no statutory assignment of the longshoreman's
potential cause of action against the shipuwner to the stevedore, who
would have made a less appealing plaintiff.91 Thus the possibility
was increased that the shipuwner would ultimately bear the burden
of injuries to longshoremen. The longshoreman has nothing to lose
by pursuing his remedy against the shipowner, because if his recovery is less than his compensation remedy would have been, compensation will be awarded to make up the difference. 92 Because of these
Longshoremen's Act to cover all injuries on navigable waters. It has been suggested
that strict reliance on this "water's edge" rule will "provide a simple practical means
for determining whether an injured man's remedy in compensation shall be under
state or under federal law." Gainsburgh & Fallon, Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co.:
The Twilight's Last Gleaming?, 37 TuL. L. REv. 79, 87-88 (1962).
While the simplicity and practicality of applying the navigable-waters jurisdictional
requirement is questionable, a valid warning is implicit in the judicial history of
which Calbeck is a part: care must be taken not to incorporate all of the "local
concern" difficulties into any new longshoremen's legislation. Employment which is
essentially similar to that of the longshoreman or harbor worker should be carefully
defined. Part of the prior confusion which arose in applying the local concern doctrine
stemmed from the fact that the principle represented ·a judicial exception to the
normal coverage of the Longshoremen's Act, and was employed on a case-by-case
basis, with the result that the exact extent of the doctrine was never clearly discernible.
Collaterally, it· should be noted that some have suggested that Congress could
now constitutionally place all maritime workers under the state compensation acts,
because all states have compensation acts that are essentially similar, so the uniformity
of the general maritime law would not be affected if state law were applied. See
Allen, That "Twilight Zone" Between the Jurisdictions of State and Federal C'?111'pensation Acts, 16 !Ns. CouNSEL J. 202, 207 (1949); Rodes, Workmen's Compensation for
Maritime Employees: Obscurity in The Twilight Zone, 68 HARv. L. REV. 637, 656
(1955).
91. GILMORE &: BLACK, ADMIRALTY 370-71 (1957). This practice of making informal
awards will probably be eliminated by a recent amendment to § 33, 73 Stat. 391
(1959), 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1964), which makes acceptance of compensation from an
employer an assignment only if the longshoreman fails to commence an action against
the shipowner within six months.
92, See 73 Stat. 391 (1959), 33 U.S.C. § 933(1) (1964).
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factors, the courts probably employed the indemnity-over the6ry to
aid in alleviating the developing financial distress of the American
shipping industry.93 Moreover, the American shipowner is less able
than the stevedore to pass on the cost of longshoreman injuries to
the consumer because he must compete with foreign carriers, while
the stevedore unloading only in American ports has no foreign
competition.
Of course, an effort to exclude the longshoreman from the scope
of protection of the seaworthiness warranty with its attendant liability without fault would reduce the shipowners' burden and make
indemnity unnecessary. Some commentators have questioned the
propriety of extending the seaworthiness warranty to longshoremen
in the first place.94 However, it must be remembered that the longshoreman performs much of his work in the "plant" of one who is
not his employer. Thus he must labor in surroundings which are
inevitably unfamiliar and sometimes hazardous. The spectre of unseaworthiness liability undoubtedly provides an incentive for the
shipowner to keep his vessel in good order.
Ideally, where a shipowner and a stevedore have both been responsible for a longshoreman's injury, each should share the burden
according to the extent to which he was at fault. However, under
current law, the stevedore in most cases ultimately bears the entire
loss.95 At least two methods for distributing the cost of compensating
longshoremen for their injuries may be posited. The first possible
solution is to allow indemnity only to the extent of the stevedore's
compensation liability.96 Under this doctrine, the stevedore would
receive the full benefit of the determinate-liability concept embodied in section 5, while the shipowner would be relieved of the burden of paying the total amount awarded to a longshoreman in an
unseaworthiness action. On the other hand, perhaps it would be
more desirable to grant the longshoreman a damage remedy similar
to that found in the Jones Act and the FELA,97 where the fellowservant and assumption-of-risk defenses are eliminated and where
comparative negligence replaces contributory negligence,98 but
against both stevedore and shipowner with the burden also distributed be1'veen them on a comparative-fault basis.99 Of course, under
93. See Shields &: Byrne, supra note 61, at 1148-51; Stover, supra note 57, at 563.
94. See Pillsbury, supra note 59, at 564; Shields &: Byrne, supra note 61, at 1151.
95. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operation Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958);
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956); cf. Atlantic &:
Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, rehearing denied, 369 U.S.
882 (1962).
96. See generally Pillsbury, supra note 59, at 542.
97. See note 47 supra.
· 98. See generally 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §§ 91.00-.77 (1961).
99. See Flowers v. Travelers Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 220, 225 (5th Cir. 1958). See generally
Conard, supra note 86, where it is suggested that the F.E.L.A. is more efficient than
workmen's compensation in terms of cost per dollar of benefit rendered.
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the latter alternative all other remedies against the stevedore and
shipovmer, including the seaworthiness warranty, would have to be
eliminated. This procedure would theoretically have the advantage
of distributing the burden more precisely according to every party's
(plaintiff's as well as defendants') respective fault. The former alternative, while distributing the burden less precisely, would give the
seaman assurance of compensation for injuries with the possibility
of seeking additional damages for unseaworthiness.
The role of weighing these policy factors and selecting among
these and other alternatives properly belongs to Congress.100 The
recent judicial decisions discussed above, perhaps attempting to
compensate for congressional inaction, have reached results both
inefficient and impractical.
Robert E. Gilbert
100. After refusing to allow recovery over by a shipowner against a harbor worker's
employer on a contribution theory, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, declared:
"Many groups of persons with varying interests are vitally concerned with the proper
functioning and administration of all these acts [the Longshoremen's Act; Jones Act;
Public Vessels Act, etc.] as an integrated whole. We think that legislative considera•
tion and action can best bring about a fair accommodation of the diverse but related
interests of these groups. The legislative process is peculiarly adapted to determine
which of the many possible solutions to this problem would be most beneficial in the
long run. The record before us is silent as to the wishes of employers, carriers, and
shippers; it only shows that the Halcyon Line is in favor of such a change in order
to relieve itself of a part of its burden in this particular lawsuit." Halcyon Lines v.
Haenn Ship Ceiling&: Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 286 (1951).

